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STATUTES - INTERPRETATION - APPLICATION OF VENUE STATUTE
TO OWNERS OF FORMS OF TRANSPORTATION UNKNOWN AT THE TIME OF ITS
ENACTMENT - An Iowa venue statute passed in 1872 provided that "an
action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages,
or other line of coaches or cars ••• in any county through which such road or
line passes or is operated." 1 A damage action was brought against petitioner in
a county through which its truck line regularly operated. Petitioner moved for
a change of venue to the county where its principal office was located. The
motion was overruled and petitioner tested the validity of the ruling in an action
in certiorari. Held, a common carrier of freight by motor truck was a "line of
cars" within the purpose and meaning of the venue statute. Bruce Transfer Co.
v. Johnston, (Iowa, 1939) 287 N. W. 278.
The problems raised in construing statutes to apply to situations and instrumentalities unknown at the time of their enactment are well illustrated in cases
involving automobiles, trucks and buses.2 The courts are generally liberal in
applying statutes passed before the advent of the automobile to motor transpor-

1 Iowa Code (1935), § 11041. The clause first appeared in a statute of 1872
and has remained unchanged since 1897.
2 The oft-quoted statement of the proposition that statutes may apply to new circumstances is found in 25 R. C. L. 778 (1919).
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tation cases. The better reasoned decisions look first to the primary purpose of
the legislature as expressed in the statute. If the statute concerns a problem
which is common to transportation generally rather than to a specific type of
vehicle, the courts apply it to motor transportation unless specific language in the
statute prohibits such application. For example, venue statutes, such as the one
in the principal case, are primarily designed to serve the convenience of litigants
in suits against common carriers which operate over regular routes. Here the
statutory purpose is as applicable to a motor truck or bus line as it was to stage
coach lines, so the courts have reason to construe the statutes to include motor
carriers. 8 Another group of cases involve statutes passed in the nineteenth century
which exempt from attachment and execution vehicles and equipment used in
earning the debtor's means of livelihood. The courts hold that automobiles and
trucks are included in the purpose and language of these exemption statutes,
where the use of the auto or truck is analogous to the use made of the vehicles
enumerated in the statute.4 Similarly, statutes regulating road and bridge tolls
for carriages or stage coaches are held to apply to automobiles and buses 5 and
statutes taxing the gross income of "transportation companies" are held to
apply to taxicab companies, although taxicabs were unknown when the taxing
law was passed.6 An analogous situation arises where statutes require railway
locomotives to be equipped with a "steam whistle" and to give certain signals
when approaching highway crossings, and the railroad subsequently adopts a
Diesel car or train. Where steam locomotives are specifically referred to in the
statute, courts do not apply the regulations to Diesel cars or trains, but when
the statutory language is more general, the latter are held to be included.7
Gess v. Wilder, 237 Ky. 839, 36 S. W. {2d) 617 (1931) {trucking company
a "common carrier'' for purposes of a similar venue statute). Contra: Great Lakes
Stages v. Laing, 123 Ohio St. 37$, 175 N. E. 598 (1931) (bus line held not a line
of "stages or other coaches" for venue purposes).
4 Some courts require that the automobile be indispensable to the debtor in
earning his living, while other courts allow exemption for autos when their use is
reasonably convenient. Compare Printz v. Shepard, 128 Kan. 210, 276 P. Su
(1929) (exemption allowed on a car used by a farmer to carry produce to market),
with Gordon v. Brewer, 32 Ohio App. 199, 166 N. E. 915 (1929) (exemption not
allowed on a car used by a real estate dealer in calling on customers, etc.), and First
National Bank v. Larson, 213 ·Iowa 468, 239 N. W. 134 (1931) (exemption not
allowed because there was no proof that the car was indispensable to debtor's business).
For purposes of exemption statutes, automobiles and trucks have been held to be included in such terms as a "wagon," a "farm utensil," and a "tool or instrument used
in a trade or profession." See annotations, 28 A. L. R. 74 (1924); 94 A. L. R.
299 (1935).
5
Burton v. Monticello, etc. Turnpike, 162 Ky. 787, 173 S. W. 144 (1915).
6
Commonwealth v. Quaker City Cab Co., 287 Pa. 161, 134 A. 404 (1926),
reversed on other grounds, 277 U. S. 389, 48 S. Ct. 553 (1928).
7
See Franklin & P. Ry. v. Shoemaker, 156 Va. 619, 159 S. E. 100 (1931),
where the cases are collected and discussed. Some courts find it difficult to rationalize
the proposition that a substituted method of performance can satisfy this type of
statute, because when they applied the statutes to steam trains, they insisted on strict
compliance with the regulations. See also, Haaga v. Saginaw Logging Co., 165 Wash.
367, 5 P. (2d) 505 (1931) (holding that the statute applied to a gasoline car), and
8

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

However, criminal statutes, under traditional criminal law doctrines of strict
interpretation, are not construed to apply to new forms of transportation, 8
Likewise, under tort law, statutes giving municipalities the duty of keeping
streets reasonably safe for carriages are not held to create a duty to keep them
safe for automobiles.9 In summarizing the results of the above decisions, two
tests can be formulated for determining the ~pplicability of a statute to a situation or instrumentality unknown at the time of its enactment. (I) Is the primary purpose or policy of the legislature as expressed in the statute applicable
to the new situation or instrumentality? ( 2) Is the language of the statute broad
enough to include the new situation or instrumentality? 10 Judged by these
tests, both the result and the reasoning of the principal case seem correct and
desirable.

Smith v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 145 Kan. 615, 66 P. (2d) 562 (1937)
(holding contra to the Washington case).
8 ln United States v. One Automobile, (D. C. Mont. 1916) 237 F. 891, the
court refused to compel the forfeiture of an automobile under a statute providing for
the forfeiture of «wagons, carts or sleds" used to transport liquor to the Indians. The
principle is best discussed by Holmes, J., in McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S.
25, 51 S. Ct. 340 (1931).
9 Doherty v. Inhabitants of Ayer, 197 Mass. 241, 83 N. E. 677 (1908). The
specific type of vehicle is of primary importance in this type of statute, as there is
a considerable difference in the upkeep of streets required for horses and carriages
and that required for automobiles. The courts are also reluctant to extend municipal
duties without express legislative authority.
10 Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REv. 863 ( 1930 ). This article
contains a good discussion of what constitutes the "purpose" of a statute. Kohler, in
"Judicial Interpretation of Enacted Law," ScIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD, SELECTED
ESSAYS 187 at 193 (1917) (9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series), states: "By recognizing that interpretation may change with the times it is possible to give statutes
a certain elasticity, by which they may correspond with changing social requirements
and continue to confer benefits on the community even after all the conditions have
changed which originally brought about their adoption."

